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Abstract 
 
Stochastic dominance permits a partial ordering of alternatives (probability distributions on 
consequences) based only on partial information about a decision maker’s utility function. 
Univariate stochastic dominance has been widely studied and applied, with general agreement 
on  classes  of  utility  functions  for  dominance  of  different  degrees.  Extensions  to  the 
multivariate  case  have  received  less  attention  and  have  used  different  classes  of  utility 
functions, some of which require strong assumptions about utility. We investigate multivariate 
stochastic dominance using a class of utility functions that is consistent with a basic preference 
assumption, can be related to well-known characteristics of utility, and is a natural extension of 
the  stochastic  order  typically  used  in  the  univariate  case.  These  utility  functions  are 
multivariate  risk  averse,  and  reversing  the  preference  assumption  allows  us  to  investigate 
stochastic  dominance  for  utility  functions  that  are  multivariate  risk  seeking.  We  provide 
insight into these two contrasting forms of stochastic dominance, develop some criteria to 
compare probability distributions (hence alternatives) via multivariate stochastic dominance, 
and illustrate how this dominance could be used in practice to identify inferior alternatives. 
Connections  between  our  approach  and  dominance  using  different  stochastic  orders  are 
discussed. 
 
Subject  classifications:  decision  analysis:  multiple  criteria,  risk;  group  decisions; 
utility/preference: multiattribute utility, stochastic dominance, stochastic orders 
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assumed by the authors. 1. Introduction 
  One of the big challenges in decision analysis is the assessment of a decision maker’s utility 
function. To the extent that the alternatives under consideration in a decision-making problem can be 
partially ordered based on less-than-full information about the utility function, the problem can be 
simplified somewhat by eliminating dominated alternatives. At the same time, partial orders can help in 
the creation of alternatives by providing an indication of the types of strategies that might be most 
promising. Stochastic dominance has been studied extensively in the univariate case, particularly in the 
finance and economics literature; early papers are Hadar & Russell (1969) and Hanoch & Levy (1969). 
For example, assuming that utility for money is increasing and concave can simplify many problems in 
finance and economics.  
  Moreover, stochastic dominance can be helpful not just in individual decision making, but 
perhaps even more so in group decision making, where the challenge of utility assessment is amplified by 
divergent preferences. Even though the group members can be expected to have different utility functions, 
these utility functions might share some common characteristics. Thus, if an alternative can be eliminated 
based on an individual’s utility function being risk averse, it can be eliminated in group decision making 
if each member of the group is risk averse, even though the degree of risk aversion may vary considerably 
among the group.   
  Multiattribute consequences make the assessment of utility even more difficult, and extensions to 
multivariate stochastic dominance are tricky because there are many multivariate stochastic orders 
(Denuit et al. 1999, Müller & Stoyan 2002, Shaked & Shantikumar 2007, Denuit & Mesfioui 2010) on 
which the dominance can be based. Hazen (1986) investigates multivariate stochastic dominance when 
simple forms of utility independence (Keeney & Raiffa 1976) can be assumed. If utility independence 
cannot be assumed, the potential benefits of stochastic dominance are even greater. Studies of 
multivariate stochastic dominance include Levy & Paroush (1974), Levhari et al. (1975), Mosler (1984), 
Scarsini (1988), and Denuit & Eeckhoudt (2010). In this paper we use a stochastic order that is consistent 
with a basic preference assumption, can be related to characteristics such as risk aversion and correlation 
  1aversion, and is a natural extension of the standard order typically used for univariate stochastic 
dominance. We also consider a stochastic order that is consistent with characteristics such as risk taking 
and correlation loving by reversing the basic preference assumption. 
  The objective of this paper is to study multivariate stochastic dominance for the above-mentioned 
stochastic orders. In §2, we define these stochastic orders, which form the basis for what we call nth-
degree multivariate concave and convex stochastic dominance. We show a connection with a preference 
for combining good with bad in the concave case and with the opposite preference for combining good 
with good and bad with bad in the convex case. Then, we extend the concept of nth-degree risk to the 
multivariate case and consider infinite-degree concave and convex stochastic dominance, which can be 
related to utility functions that are mixtures of multiattribute exponential utilities. In §3, we develop some 
ways to facilitate the comparison of alternatives via multivariate stochastic dominance, focusing on the 
impact of background risk, on dominance results when the joint probability distribution for the attributes 
is multivariate normal, and on eliminating alternatives from consideration by comparing an alternative 
with a mixture of other alternatives. A simple hypothetical example is presented in §4, and in §5 we 
compare our multivariate stochastic dominance with dominance based on another family of stochastic 
orders possessing some interesting similarities and differences. A brief summary and concluding 
comments are given in §6.      
2. Multivariate Stochastic Dominance and Preferences for Combining Good with Bad or Good with 
Good and Bad with Bad 
2.1. Multivariate concave and convex stochastic dominance  
We begin by defining some notation. A random vector is denoted by a tilde,   is a vector 
of zeroes. For two N-dimensional vectors    
 Also,   denotes the component-wise sum, 
 and 0   x,
 if  x y ¢
) .
and  ,   if   for  1, , and   for jj jj xy j N xy >> = ≥ … xy x y
11 (, , NN all   and  j ≠ xy . + xy x yx y + + … , ]    xy
or  .    xy
 We let [  denote 
a lottery with equal chances of getting    
Next, we formalize the notion of alternating signs for the partial derivatives of u, a multiattribute 
  2utility function for a vector of N attributes. 
DEFINITION 1.  { } 1
1 ( 1) ( ) / 0 for  1, ,  and any  {1, , }, 1, , .
k
Nk k
ni i j uu x x k n i N j
− =−∂ ∂∂ ≥ = ∈ =  … … U x k …    
N
n U  consists of all N-dimensional real-valued functions for which all partial derivatives of a given 
degree up to degree n have the same sign, and that sign alternates, being positive for odd degrees and 
negative for even degrees. Observe that if  , then   for any  .
NN
nk uu k n ∈ ∈< UU  Also, if  ,
N
n u∈U  then for 
any      and  {1, , }, 1, , , j kn i Nj k <∈ = ……
12 (1 ) () / .
k
kk N
ii i n k ux x x− −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∈   U x  Now we use 
N
n U  to define 
multivariate concave stochastic dominance. 
DEFINITION 2. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] , xx    dominates   in the 
sense of n
th-degree concave stochastic dominance if 
  x   y
[ ( )] [ ( )] for all  ,   defined on
N
n uu u u    EE xy U ≥∈  
[,] . xx   
THEOREM 1. Let  ,  , , and   be mutually independent N-dimensional random vectors with   
dominating   in the sense of i
th-degree concave stochastic dominance, 
m   x m   y n   x n   y i   x
i   y ,. im n =  Then [,] mn mn +      x+ yy  x  
dominates [  in the sense of   concave stochastic dominance.  ] mn    x ,m   y+n   y x+
th () nm - d e g r e e +
Theorem 1 shows that concave stochastic dominance from Definition 2 is consistent with a 
preference for combining good with bad (up to degree n), where good and bad are understood in terms of 
lower-degree concave stochastic dominance. What if a decision maker prefers to combine good with good 
and bad with bad, as opposed to combining good with bad? Next we define convex stochastic dominance, 
which is consistent with such preferences.  
DEFINITION 1*.  { } 1 ( ) / 0 for  1, ,  and any  {1, , }, 1, , .
k
Nk
ni i j uu x x k n i Nj k =∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ = ∈ =  … … U x …    
,
N
n U  consisting of all N-dimensional real-valued functions for which all partial derivatives of 
degree up to n are positive, is called  s idircx − U  by Denuit & Mesfioui (2010) and forms the basis for the s-
increasing directionally convex order. Similar to  ,
N
n U  if  , then 
NN
nk uu ∈ UU ∈  for any    Also, if  . kn <
,
N
n u∈U  then for any     and  , 1, , , j kn i j k <∈ = …… {1, , } N
12 () / . k k
kN
ii i n ux x x− ∂ ∂ ∈   U x ∂∂    
  3DEFINITION 2*. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] , xx    dominates   in the 
sense of n
th-degree convex stochastic dominance if   for all 
  x   y
[ ( )] [ ( )] uu ≥   EE x  y ,   defi on
N
n uu ∈U ned   
[,] . xx  
THEOREM 1*. Let   be N-dimensional independent random vectors with   dominating 
 in the sense of i
th-degree convex stochastic dominance, 
,,,    mmn n and       xyx y i   x
i   y ,. im n =  Then [,  dominates 
 in the sense of   convex stochastic dominance. 
] mn m      x+ xy+n   y
[, mn m ++       xy yx ] n +
th () nm - d e g r e e
Definition 2 extends the standard definition of univariate stochastic dominance to the multivariate 
case. As Theorem 1 shows, it preserves a preference for combining good with bad (Eeckhoudt & 
Schlesinger 2006, Eeckhoudt et al. 2009). Definition 2* and Theorem 1* develop similar orderings based 
on the opposite preference for combining good with good and bad with bad, and show the connection 
between convex and concave stochastic dominance that follows from the fact that  ()
N
n u ∈ x U  if and only 
if  ()
N
n u −+ − ∈ xxx U .   
REMARK. The multivariate convex stochastic dominance in Definition 2* is different from what Fishburn 
(1974) calls convex stochastic dominance. Fishburn’s usage of “convex” does not relate to the utility 
function. Instead, it refers to dominance results for convex combinations, or mixtures, of probability 
distributions in the univariate case, which we will extend to the multivariate case in §3.3 and use to 
eliminate alternatives in decision-making problems in §4. To clarify the distinction, we will use the term 
“mixture dominance” when referring to the type of stochastic dominance developed by Fishburn (1974, 
1978). In contrast, our multivariate convex stochastic dominance can be thought of as “risk-taking 
stochastic dominance” because   for any  1
N
n u ∈ U n >
,
 implies that u is multivariate risk seeking in the 
sense of Richard (1975). Not only do we have   but the underlying condition 
of preferring to combine good with good and bad with bad can be viewed as a form of risk taking. 
Similarly, our multivariate concave stochastic dominance from Definition 2 can be thought of as “risk-
averse stochastic dominance” because 
22 /0  f o r   1 , , i ux i N ∂∂ ≥ = …
for any  1 un
N
n ∈ > U  means that u is multivariate risk averse 
  4(Richard 1975). Also, the preference for combining good with bad associated with 
N
n u∈U  implies that u 
is correlation averse (Epstein & Tanny 1980, Eeckhoudt et al. 2007, Denuit et al. 2010), which can be 
viewed as a form of risk aversion. Similarly, the preference for combining good with good and bad with 
bad associated with 
N
n u∈U  implies that u is correlation loving, a form of risk taking. 
2.2. The notion of n
th-degree risk in the multivariate case  
  By Definition 2 (2*), concave (convex) stochastic dominance of degree n implies stochastic 
dominance of any higher degree. To isolate a higher-degree effect in the univariate case, Ekern (1980) 
introduced the concept of n
th-degree risk. This subsection extends that concept to the multivariate case 
and relates it to concave and convex stochastic dominance.  
DEFINITION 3. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] , , <<<    xx x x y − ∞∞  has 
more n
th-degree risk than   i f    for all    x [( ) ] u E ) ] [( u ≥   E x  y defined on [ , ] u xx such that 
 for any iN
1
1 (1 ) () / 0
n
nn
i ux
− −∂ ∂∂   x i x ≥ {1, j , },  1, , . j n ∈ = ……  
THEOREM 2. The random vector   has more n
th-degree risk than the random vector   if and only if    y   x
 (i)  in the sense of n
th-degree concave stochastic dominance, and    dominates   x y      
  y  (ii)  the k
th moments of   are identical for      and   x 1, , 1: kn = − …  
12 12 [] [
kk ii i ii i ] x xx y yy =            EE  for 
         {1, , , . j any i k …… , },   1 N j ∈=
REMARK. In the univariate case, Ekern (1980) defines a person as being “n
th-degree risk averse” if the n
th 
derivative of her utility function is positive (negative) when n is odd (even). Our interpretation of 
multivariate concave stochastic dominance as risk-averse stochastic dominance is consistent with the 
extension of the notion of being n
th-degree risk averse to the multivariate case. 
THEOREM 2*. The random vector   has more n
th-degree risk than the random vector   if and only if    y   x
  (i)  in the sense of n
th-degree convex stochastic dominance when         (   ) dominates dominates      xy y     x
  y
  n  is  odd  (even), and 
 (ii)  the k
th moments of   are identical for    and    x 1, , 1. kn = − …  
  5The proof of Theorem 2* is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. 
COROLLARY TO THEOREMS 2 AND 2*. If n is odd (even) and the k
th moments of   are identical 
for   then   in the sense of n
th-degree concave stochastic dominance if and 
only if   (  in the sense of n
th-degree convex stochastic dominance. 
    and   x  y
    y
  x
1, , 1, kn =− …
dominate
  dominates   x
    dominates   y    s    xy )
  Thus, if all moments of degree less than n are identical, convex dominance goes along with 
higher n
th moments for both odd and even n. With concave dominance, this holds only for odd n. For even 
n, concave dominance goes along with lower n
th moments. These results relate stochastic dominance to 
ordering by moments, in the sense that convex dominance likes all moments to be higher, whereas 
concave dominance likes odd moments to be higher and even moments to be lower.  
2.3. Infinite-degree dominance  
Now we explore what emerges if a preference between combining good with bad, or combining 
good with good and bad with bad, holds for any n. In this case dominance relations are defined via 
N
∞ U  
and  ,
N
∞ U  which extend 
N
n U  and  .
N
n U  
DEFINITION 4.  { } 1
1 ( 1) ( ) / 0 for  1,2,  and any  {1, , }, 1, , ,
k
Nk k
ii j uu x x k i N j
−
∞ =−∂ ∂∂ ≥ = ∈ =  … … x U k …  
and  { } 1 ( ) / 0 for  1,2,  and any  {1, , }, 1, , .
k
Nk
ii j uu x x k i Nj k ∞ =∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ = ∈ =  … … x U …
  y
 
DEFINITION 5. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x [,] , xx    dominates   in the 
sense of infinite-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance if  for all 
  x
[ (
  y
[ ( )] )] uu ≥   EE x  y
N u ∞ ∈U  
() ,
N u ∞ ∈U    defined on [ , ]. u xx  
Increasing the degree of dominance (n) restricts the set of utility functions with respect to which 
two random vectors are compared. Similarly, expanding the domain of definition of u (i.e., decreasing  x  
and/or increasing  ) x  also restricts the set of utility functions, and thus increases the set of random vectors 
that can be ordered by stochastic dominance. As shown in Theorem 3, any  ,   defined on [ , ),
N uu ∞ ∈ x U ∞   
or  ,   defined on  ( ],
N uu ∞ ∈ x U ∞, −  is a mixture of multiattribute exponential utilities. Theorem 4 then 
shows that infinite-order dominance can be operationalized via multiattribute exponential utilities.  
  6THEOREM 3. Consider a function ()  defined on  , u x [, . x ∞
︶
 Then 
N u ∞ ∈U  if and only if there exists a (not 
necessarily finite) measure F on [  and constants   with   such that   , ) 0 ∞ 1,, N bb … 0, 1, , , i bi ≥= … N
      () () ( ) 11 1 1 1 00 () () 1e x p ( ) ( ) (, , ) ( ) .
N
NN N N ii i i uu r x x r x xd F r r b x x
∞∞
= =+ −−− + + − + − ∑ ∫∫  … … xx        (1) 
Viewing the linear terms in (1) as limiting forms of exponential utilities   
and rescaling, we can express any  
(  0   0  ) ij as r with r for j i →= ≠
,     [ , ),
N u u defined on ∞ ∈ x U ∞   as a mixture of multiattribute 
exponential utilities, 
() 11 1 00 () e x p (, , ) . NN N ur x r x d F
∞∞
=− − − − ∫∫  … x r r …                   (2) 
Similarly, any  ,
N u ∞ ∈U    ( u defined on − x] , ∞,  can be expressed as   
() 11 1 00 () e x p (, , ) . NN N ur x r x d F r
∞∞
=+ + ∫∫  … … x r                     (3) 
A proof for the concave case in Theorem 3 is given in Tsetlin & Winkler (2009), and the proof for the 
convex case is similar. From Theorem 3, we can state the following result without a proof. 
 THEOREM 4. The random vector   dominates the random vector   in the sense of infinite-degree 
concave stochastic dominance for 
  x   y
   [,) u defined on x ∞  if and only if  ( ) 11 [exp ] NN ry r y − −− ≥    … E  
 for all  () 11 [exp ] NN rx r x −− −   … E   [, ) , 0 ∈ r ∞  and   dominates   in the sense of infinite-degree convex 
stochastic dominance for 
  x   y
   ( n ] u x ∞ defined o − ,  if and only if  ( ) 11 ] NN rx r x [exp + +≥    … E  
 for all    () 11 [exp ] NN ry r y ++    … E [, ) . 0 r ∞ ∈
Theorem 4 provides a convenient criterion for comparing multivariate probability distributions. 
Note that the expectations in Theorem 4 correspond to moment generating functions for distributions of 
 If we define   then for concave stochastic dominance we need   and  .   x  y x () ( ) 11 [exp ], NN Mr x r =+ +      … E x r
( ) ( ) M ≤   x M   y rr  for all   and for convex stochastic dominance we need  ( ] ,, ∈− 0 r ∞ ( ) ( ) MM ≥    xy rr  for 
all    [ , ∈ 0 r ). ∞
REMARK. The domain of definition of u is crucial for the result stated in Theorem 4. For instance, if 
  712 ( , ) (0.5,0.5) and  [(0,1),(1,0)], xx == =    xy
  x   y
 then by examining the expectations in Theorem 4 we can 
show that   dominates   by infinite-degree concave stochastic dominance for u defined on [, ) x ∞  (e.g., 
on [  However, consider   u defined on [  Theorem 4 does not apply here, 
and taking expectations with respect to u yields 
, )) 0 ∞. 12 () ux =+ x 1 2 , x x x − , ]. 01
( ) ( ) ] 0.75 ] 1. uu [ [ = <=   y   EE x  Therefore,   does not 
dominate   by infinite-degree concave stochastic dominance. If we increase the upper limit of the 
domain of this u above 1, then 
  x
  y
2 u ∞ ∉U  because  () / 0 , w h e n   i ux  1 , 2 ,   i . ∂ ∂< x
).
= > 1 x A similar situation can 
occur for any N, including the univariate case ( 1 N =  As noted previously, expanding the domain of 
definition of u restricts the set of utility functions with respect to which random vectors are compared. In 
the example, the set of utility functions 
2 u ∞ ∈U defined on [  is larger than the set of utility functions  , ] 01
2 u ∞ ∈U  defined on [  The former set includes  , 0 ∞). 12 () ux x 1 2 , x x = +− x  whereas the latter does not.     
3. Comparing Alternatives via Multivariate Stochastic Dominance 
Here we present several results that are useful for comparing alternatives according to the 
stochastic dominance relations from §2. In §3.1 we show conditions under which dominance orderings 
remain unchanged in the presence of background risk, with independence playing an important role. In 
§3.2 we consider the case in which the distributions of the consequences are multivariate normal. In §3.3 
we use mixture dominance to show that an alternative, even if not dominated by any single alternative, 
can be eliminated from consideration if it is dominated by a mixture of other alternatives.   
3.1. Stochastic dominance with additive and multiplicative background risk 
When one faces a choice between two (or more) risky alternatives, this decision is often not 
made in isolation, in the sense that there are other risks that affect the decision maker but are outside of 
the decision maker’s control. Therefore, it is important to know whether a stochastic dominance ordering 
established in the absence of background risk will remain the same when background risk is present. 
Consider a choice between two projects, with consequences characterized by random vectors 
 In the presence of additive background risk, represented by the random vector   we are   and  .   x  y ,   a
  8interested in comparing   In the presence of multiplicative background risk, represented 
by the random vector   the appropriate comparison is between 
 and  . +       ax ay
,
+
  m  and  , where  ⊗ ⊗⊗       mx my mx
  y
 and  . am
and  ;    am
to  )
 
denotes the component-wise product,   If both additive and multiplicative background 
risks are present,   
11 (, , NN m x …
 are compar ⊗   y
,
  x
,  ,   ,  and     a m m
dominates    x
inates  +    am
and    x
  y
  y
) .
  y
mx
 and  +⊗ +      x am
,    ,  and 0       ¢ a m m
  , s   y | ma
+⊗      am y
  y
   x, y
 and  .    am
 dom +⊗      am x
  x
ed.
x,
  o  
inates
  ¢
⊗
  y
  a
   am
 ,     y
minate
  
THEOREM 5. Let   be N-dimensional random vectors such that for any fixed   
and  in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance. Then 
 in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance. 
a
, , d m x | ma
dom +⊗      am x
The result of Theorem 5 is quite intuitive. If   is preferred to   for each possible value of   
and   then   is preferred to   even if we are uncertain about the exact values of   If the 
project risk is independent of the background risk, the situation is further simplified. 
a
, m   x
COROLLARY 1 TO THEOREM 5. Let   be N-dimensional random vectors such that 
 are independent of   If   in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) 
stochastic dominance, then   in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) 
stochastic dominance. 
, 0
  y
  y
 and    x
Thus, independent background risk preserves stochastic dominance orderings. Note that no 
assumption is made about the relationship between the background risks   they can be dependent. 
The assumption of independence of the project risk and the background risk is crucial, however. If 
background risk is not independent of project risk, preferences with and without background risk might be 
the opposite (Tsetlin & Winkler 2005). For example, suppose that a manager is considering adding a new 
project to an existing portfolio of projects. Let   represent the consequences of two potential new 
projects, and let   represent the consequences of the existing portfolio. Even if the manager is 
multivariate risk averse and   dominates   in terms of multivariate concave stochastic dominance, she 
might prefer the new project associated with   (i.e., prefer  + +    ax    ay
.
 if the correlations between the 
components of   and   are smaller than those for       a   y and     ax
  9Theorem 5 and its Corollary 1 can also be used to compare random vectors that are functions of 
other random vectors, which can be ordered by stochastic dominance. For instance, if the consequences of 
a particular alternative can be represented as  + ⊗      am x and any of the mutually independent random 
vectors   and   is improved in the sense of stochastic dominance, what can we say about the 
resulting changes to this alternative? 
, ,    xa   m
COROLLARY 2 TO THEOREM 5. Let   be mutually independent N-dimensional 
independent random vectors with   dominating   in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) 
stochastic dominance,   Then 
11 2 2 , , ,    and       xyx y
i   y
12
i   x
1, 2. i = +    xx  dominates  12 +    yy
,  and 0
 in the sense of n
th-degree concave 
(convex) stochastic dominance. If  11 2 , ,  00     ¢¢¢ 2 1 2 1  ,        then dominates ⊗⊗ 0         ¢ 2   x y x y xx yy  in 
the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance. 
REMARK. It might be that, e.g.,   dominates  1 +    xx 2 2 1 +    yy  in the sense of stochastic dominance of degree 
lower than   For example, consider the univariate case (i.e.,  . n 1) N =  with  12 1 1,    0, xx y = ==       and  2 y =    
 Then  [, ] . cc − i x    dominates   in the sense of second-degree concave stochastic dominance for i i y   1,2, =  
but also note that  1 x  
1
 dominates   in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance. In this case  1 y  
12 2 1, [  and  , ]. x xy y =   c c
1, >+
+=    +   −  For   in the sense of first-degree 
stochastic dominance, but for cx  only in the sense of second-degree 
concave stochastic dominance. 
12 1,   cx y ≤+     
12 1    domin x   
1 es  y +  
2 y +  
2 dominat x
ates  y  
Theorem 5 and its corollaries show that, e.g., adding a non-negative random vector improves a 
multivariate distribution in the sense of first-degree concave and convex stochastic dominance. They also 
imply that if a set of N variables can be divided into two stochastically independent subgroups, and one of 
these groups is improved in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance, then the joint 
distribution over all N variables is improved in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic 
dominance. In particular, if N random variables are independent, then their joint distribution is improved 
in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance whenever the marginal distribution of 
  10any of the variables is improved in the sense of n
th-degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance.  
3.2. Comparison of multivariate normal distributions via infinite-degree dominance 
The multivariate normal distribution is the most commonly encountered multivariate distribution, 
is very tractable, and is a reasonable representation of uncertainty in many situations. Müller (2001) 
provides several results on the stochastic ordering of multivariate normal distributions. The expectations 
appearing in Theorem 4 are especially tractable in this case, and thus the comparison of two multivariate 
normal distributions based on infinite-degree (concave and convex) stochastic dominance criterion is 
greatly simplified. If the random vector   is multivariate normal with mean vector    x 1 (,, ) N μ μ = … μ  and 
covariance matrix  ( ) ( ) 11 ( ), then  xp ] exp ( /2
t
ij i j N N rx r x ρσσ =− + =    … rr r E ΣΣ μ
11 1
(/ ) / 2 .
NN N
tt
ii i ji ji j
ii j
rr r μρ σ σ
== =
⎛⎞
+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ Σ rr μ
[e
2 += r
) ,
t +  where a superscript 
t denotes transposition and   Thus, we have the following 
corollary to Theorem 4. 
COROLLARY TO THEOREM 4. Let   and   be multivariate normal vectors with mean vectors    x   y x μ  and 
y μ  and  covariance matrices   a . nd  x y ΣΣ
/2) y + r r μ
 Then   dominates   in the sense of infinite-degree concave 
stochastic dominance if and only if   for all   and   
dominates   in the sense of infinite-degree convex stochastic dominance if and only if 
 for all 
  x
(/
tt
yy r μ
[,
  y
t
x r 2 ) (/
t
x +≥ + ΣΣ -r r μ
) .
2 ) -r
t
r [, ) , ∈ 0 r ∞   x
  y
tt
xx μ ( /2) (
t
y +≥ ΣΣ rr rr ∈ 0 r ∞  
Thus, increasing any mean  i μ  leads to stochastic dominance improvement (both concave and 
convex). Decreasing any correlation  ij ρ  leads to concave (convex) stochastic dominance improvement 
(deterioration). Decreasing any standard deviation  i σ  leads to concave (convex) stochastic dominance 
improvement (deterioration) if  0 for all  . ij j ρ ≥  However, if  0 ij ρ <  for some j, things are more 
complicated. Overall, adding independent noise to attribute i leads to the increase of  i σ  and to the 
decrease of the absolute value of correlations  . ij ρ  Thus, increasing  i σ  without changing correlations is 
  11equivalent to adding independent noise to attribute i and then to adjusting the correlations  ij ρ  up (if  ij ρ  is 
positive) or down (if  ij ρ  is negative). For concave (convex) stochastic dominance, adding independent 
noise is bad (good), and adjusting correlations up (down) is bad (good). If all correlations are positive, 
increasing any standard deviation leads to convex (concave) stochastic dominance improvement 
(deterioration). If some correlations are negative, the effect might go either way. Tsetlin & Winkler 
(2007) established similar confounding effects of increasing standard deviations in target-oriented 
situations. 
3.3. Elimination by mixtures 
  If an alternative (represented by a random vector) is dominated by some other alternative when 
the decision maker’s utility falls in a particular class (e.g.,  or 
N
n u
N
∞ ∈UU  for concave stochastic 
dominance and    or 
NN
∞ ∈ U
1 −
n U u  for convex stochastic dominance), then the dominated alternative can be 
eliminated from further consideration, thereby simplifying the decision-making problem. Mixture 
dominance, developed by Fishburn (1974) as “convex stochastic dominance” for the univariate case, 
allows us to eliminate an alternative even if it is not dominated by any other single alternative, as long as 
it is dominated by a mixture of other alternatives, which is a weaker condition (Fishburn 1978). We 
define mixture dominance for the multivariate case and then extend Fishburn’s (1978) result regarding 
elimination by mixtures. 
DEFINITION 6. For the random vectors   dominates 
 in the sense of mixture dominance with respect to   if there exists 
*
11 , ,  and utility class  ,  ( , , kk − =…       … U xx xx
* U 11 (,, k pp −
)   x
)
k
k   x , = ≥ 0 … p
* )] [ ( )] for all  . ik u u ≥∈    xx EE U
 
 such that    
1
1 1, i p
−
= =
k
i ∑
1
1 [ (
k
i i pu
−
= ∑
  From Definition 6, the mixture can be thought of as a two-step process. In the first step, an 
alternative (a random vector   is chosen from   where  ) i   x , k −   x i p  represents the probability of choosing 
 Then at the second step, the uncertainty about   is resolved. Mixture dominance means that this 
mixture has a higher expected utility than    
. i   x i   x
r all u
* fo . k ∈   x U
  12THEOREM 6. If   in the sense of mixture dominance with respect to   then for every     dominates  k −   x
   { 1 , , 1 }  is an i k ∈∈ …
k   x
*, U
*,     [( ) ] [( ) ] . ik u there such that u u − ≥    U x x EE  
  Note that the   in Theorem 6 can be different for different   The importance of Theorem 
6 is that if 
i   x
*. u∈U
* and   dominates  k u − ∈   k   x x U
k   x
 in the sense of mixture dominance with respect to the utility 
class of interest, then we can eliminate   from consideration even if none of   dominates   
individually. Reducing the set of alternatives that need to be considered seriously is always helpful. Since 
some of the mixing probabilities can be zero, note that we can eliminate an alternative if it is dominated in 
the sense of mixture dominance by any subset of the other alternatives. Of course, mixture dominance 
with respect to 
1 ,, k−    … xx 1 k   x
, ,
NN
∞  ,  or
N
nn UUU   
N
∞ U  is of particular interest because it invokes concave or convex 
stochastic dominance and relates to a preference for combining good with bad or the opposite preference 
for combining good with good and bad with bad.   
4. Examples 
An important aspect of decision analysis is the assessment of a decision maker’s (DM’s) utility 
function, and this is especially challenging in a multiattribute context. The problem is somewhat 
simplified if some potential alternatives can be eliminated from consideration without having to assess the 
full utility function, and that is where multivariate stochastic dominance can be helpful. In this section, we 
present a simple hypothetical example to illustrate the concepts from §§2-3 without getting distracted by 
complicating details.  
Suppose that a telecom company is entering a new market and deciding among different entry 
strategies. For simplicity, assume that the DM focuses on two attributes,  1 x  (the net present value (NPV) 
of profits for the first five years, in millions of dollars) and  2 x  (the market share in percentage terms at 
the end of the five-year period). To begin, it is not surprising to find that the DM prefers more of each of 
these attributes to less. For example, she prefers  12 ( , ) ( ,40) to (2 30). xx 300 00, =  This is simple first-
degree multivariate stochastic dominance.  
  13Next, if the DM concludes that she is risk averse with respect to NPV, then   would be 
preferred to [  a risky alternative that yields   with equal 
probabilities. Similarly, if she is risk averse with respect to market share, then (  would be 
preferred to [  These two choices are consistent with second-degree concave stochastic 
dominance but not sufficient to indicate that she would always want to behave in accordance with second-
degree concave stochastic dominance. For example, the risk aversion with respect to NPV and market 
share is not sufficient to dictate her choice between the two risky alternatives [  and 
 She states a preference for the latter and decides after some thought that she is, in 
general, correlation averse. Thus, her preferences are consistent with second-degree concave stochastic 
dominance. 
(250,30)
0)
,35)
,40),(200,
(300,30),(200,30)],
(250,30),(250,40)].
200,40)].
(300,30) or (200,3
250
(300 30)]
[(300,30),(
In practice, most comparisons between competing alternatives are not as clear-cut as the above 
examples. In other words, once obviously inferior alternatives have been eliminated, it may be hard to 
find many cases where one alternative dominates another. However, by looking at three or more 
alternatives, we may still be able to eliminate alternatives via mixture dominance, as discussed in §3.3.  
For a simple example, consider the choice among three alternatives: (  
 The first alternative gives a higher NPV, the second alternative gives a higher 
market share, and the third alternative is risky, with equal chances of either the high NPV and the high 
market share or the low NPV and the low market share. Note that a 50-50 mixture of the first two 
alternatives, [  dominates the third alternative by second-degree concave stochastic 
dominance, consistent with the DM’s preference for combining good with bad. By Theorem 6, then, we 
can eliminate the third alternative.  
300,30), (200,40), and
[(300,40),(200,30)].
(300,30),(200,40)],
Of course, if the DM has the opposite preference for combining good with good and bad with 
bad, then convex stochastic dominance is relevant and the second-degree dominance orderings in the 
above examples will be reversed. For example, [  dominates   by second-
degree convex stochastic dominance. Similarly, [  dominates [    by 
(300,30),(200,30)]
(300,40),(200,30)]
(250,30)
(300,3 , 0), (200,40)]
  14second-degree convex stochastic dominance, reflecting the fact that the DM is correlation loving. 
  The above comparisons among alternatives might have to be made in the presence of background 
risk. For example, the DM might be uncertain about the financial results of other ongoing projects of the 
telecom company, implying additive background risk with respect to the first attribute (NPV). She might 
also be uncertain about competitors' moves, which could translate into additive background risk with 
respect to the second attribute (market share). Finally, suppose that the company operates internationally 
and wants to express its NPV in another currency. In this case, the appropriate exchange rate, in the 
absence of hedging, would operate as multiplicative background risk with respect to the first attribute. As 
shown in §3.1, if the consequences of each alternative are independent of the background risk, then any 
stochastic dominance orderings are preserved and any resulting elimination of alternatives remains 
optimal under such background risk.   
5. Comparisons with Other Multivariate Stochastic Orders 
 
  Many multivariate stochastic orders have been studied, and the appropriate order upon which to 
base multivariate stochastic dominance is not as obvious as it is in the univariate case. Once we move 
from   the relationship among the attributes complicates matters both in terms of the joint 
probability distribution and in terms of the utility function. We focus here on multivariate s-increasing 
orders, a family of stochastic orders for which some interesting connections and comparisons with our 
multivariate concave and convex stochastic dominance can be drawn. This helps to highlight potential 
advantages and disadvantages of our approach.   
1  to  1, NN =>
  We begin by presenting the multivariate s-increasing concave order, where  1 (, , ) N s s = … s  is a 
vector of positive integers, and defining stochastic dominance in terms of this order. This is a natural 
generalization of the bivariate   concave orders introduced by Denuit et al. (1999) and 
studied by Denuit & Eeckhoudt (2010) and Denuit et al. (2010).   
12 ( , )-increasing ss
DEFINITION 7. 
11 1 1
1 1 ( 1) ( ) / 0 for  0,1, , ,  1, , ,  1 .
NN
ii ii N N kk k k N
icv N i i i i uu x x k s i N
== −
− =
⎧⎫ ∑∑ =− ∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ = = ≥ ⎨⎬
⎩⎭ ∑  … … Us x k  
  15DEFINITION 8. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] , xx    dominates   in the 
sense of the multivariate s-increasing concave order if   for all   u defined on 
  x
u
  y
[ ( )] [ ( )] uu ≥   EE x  y ,
N
icv − ∈Us
[,] . xx  
 If  1 , N s ss === …  we say that the order is an s-increasing concave order. Special cases of this are 
the lower orthant order when  1 s =  and the lower orthant concave order when  2 s =  (Mosler 1984). With 
the lower orthant order, for example,   dominates   if    x   y ( ) ( ) for all  [ , ]. PP ≤ ≤≤ ∈    xc yc c x x  
  Our multivariate concave stochastic dominance, based on  ,
N
n U  has a convex counterpart, based 
on  .
N
n U  Similarly,   and dominance in terms of the s-increasing concave order have convex 
counterparts (Denuit and Mesfioui 2010).  
N
icv − Us
DEFINITION 7*. 
1 1
1 1 ( ) / 0 for  0,1, , ,  1, , ,  1 .
N
i iN N k k k N
icx N i i i i uux x k s i Nk
=
− =
⎧ ⎫ ∑ =∂ ∂ ∂≥ = = ≥ ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ∑  … … Us x  
DEFINITION 8*. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] , xx    dominates   in the 
sense of the multivariate s-increasing convex order if   for all   u defined on 
  x
u∈
  y
[ ( )] [ ( )] uu ≥   EE x  y ,
N
icx − Us
[,] . xx  
 The  s-increasing concave order and the s-increasing convex order are closely related, because   
dominates   in the s-increasing concave order if and only if 
  x
  y  dominates  + −+    xxy xxx −  in the s-
increasing convex order. This follows from the fact that if   then  ,
N
icv u − ∈ s U () .
N
icx u − −+ − ∈ s xxx U  An s-
increasing convex order with  1 N s s === …
1
s  is an s-increasing convex order. Analogous to the concave 
case, the s-increasing convex order with s =  is the upper orthant order, under which   dominates   if    x   y
( ) ) for all  [ , ]. >≥ > ∈    xc yc c x x ( PP  
  The lower and upper orthant orders, based on lower orthants { | } ≤ xx c
1 for any ≤
 and upper orthants  
 for a given c, highlight an important way in which moving from the univariate to the 
multivariate case makes stochastic orders and stochastic dominance more complex. In the univariate case, 
 When   
{| } > xx c
() Px c ≤+ () 1  f o r  a n y   Px c c >=    . 2,  ( ) ( ) NP P ≥≤ + >    xc xc [,] , ∈ cx x  and this 
  16becomes more of an issue as N increases because the lower and upper orthants for a given c represent 
only 2 of the   orthants associated with c.  2
N
  Theorem 7 provides conditions characterizing stochastic dominance in the sense of the 
multivariate s-increasing concave and convex orders via partial moments, without reference to utilities. 
The following remark indicates an alternative characterization in terms of integral conditions.   
THEOREM 7. Let   be random vectors with support contained in   and    x  y [,] ,  , − << xx x <x ∞∞  and 
denote   Then  {, 0 } . x x xm a + =
(i)   dominates   in the sense of the multivariate s-increasing concave order if and only if     x   y
11
11 () ii x
, iN …
()     [ , ]           1 , , 1 ,
ii NN kk
ii i i i ii ii i i ii c c y for all c x x if k s and c x if k s
−−
++ ==
⎡⎤ −≤ − ∈ = ==− ⎣⎦ ∏∏    … EE ⎡⎤
⎣⎦
.
 
     1, =
(ii)   dominates   in the sense of the multivariate s-increasing convex order if and only if    x   y
11
11 () ii c
, iN …
()     [ , ]           1 , , 1 ,
ii NN kk
ii i i i ii i i i i ii x y c for all c x x if k s and c x if k s
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REMARK.  Alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance in the multivariate s-increasing 
concave and convex orders involve integral conditions. Let F  x  be the cumulative distribution function 
 for  Starting with  () P ≤   xx .   x
(1, ,1) , F F =
…
  x  x  define recursively the integrated left tails of   as     x
 
11 (,, kk 1 ,, ) (,,,, )
1 () (, ,, , )
i
iN i N
i
x k kkk
iN i x F F xzx d z =∫
…… … …
   …… xx x
+
1 ≥
()
k
ii cx
+  
                    (4) 
for   The lower partial moments in Theorem 7(i) can be expressed via integrated left tails: 
 Then   dominates   in the sense of the multivariate 
s-increasing concave order if and only if 
1,, . N kk …
i ( )
1 1 (,, )
11 1! () .
N NN kk
i ii k F
−
==
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∏∏
…
  x c E   x   y
11 (, k (,, ) (
kk , ) ) ( ) for all [ ] if   and 
NN k
ii i i i i i   F Fc x x k s c x ≤ ∈= = cc
,
……
   xy  
 When  if     1, , . i N = …… 1, N 1, , ks 1, ii =− =  (4) is the standard integral condition for univariate stochastic 
dominance.  
  17  An expression similar to (4), involving integrated right tails of   holds for the multivariate s-
increasing convex order (Denuit & Mesfioui 2010). If   define 
recursively  
  x,
)  a x
(1, ,1) () ( n d   , GP GG => =
…
     xx xx   x
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iN i N
i
x kk k kkk
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x GG x z x d z
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…… … …
   …… xx x
for   Then   dominates   in the sense of the multivariate s-increasing convex order if and 
only if 
1,, 1 . N kk ≥ …   x   y
11 (, k ……
   xy
(,, ) (
kk , ) ) ( ) for  [ ] if   and 
NN k
ii i i i i GG c x x k s ≥∈ = cc
,
N all  i c x = f   1, , 1,   1, , . ii ks i  i = −= ……  
  Mosler (1984) showed that stochastic dominance in terms of two special cases of the multivariate 
s-increasing concave order is related to multiplicative utilities. First,   dominates   in terms of the 
lower orthant order   if and only if   for all multiplicative utilities of the form 
 where ux  Second, this 
dominance extends to the lower orthant concave order (
  x
l  , i x
  y
. N =
( 1) s =
) (), ii
[ ( )] [ ( )] uu ≥   EE x
0 and  ( ) / ii i d ux d x ≤≥
2 s
  y
x (
1 ()
N
i uu
= =− − ∏ x ( ) 0 for al   1, , ii i …
) =  if each   is also concave. Theorem 8 
extends these results to the multivariate s-increasing concave order for any s, showing that this order 
corresponds to the preferences of decision makers having utility functions consistent with mutual utility 
independence (Keeney & Raiffa 1976). 
() ii ux
THEOREM 8. For random vectors   with support contained in   and    x  y [,] ,  , − << xx x <x ∞ ∞    
dominates   in the sense of the multivariate s-increasing concave order if and only if 
 for all 
  x
  y
11 ( ) ]
NN N
ii ii uy
==    E (1 ) [ ( ) ] (1 ) [
N
ii ux −≤ − ∏∏ E
1 0, ,  1, , .
i ii s uu i ≤∈ = … U N  
  We now compare our multivariate dominance with dominance for the multivariate s-increasing 
orders. There are some close similarities between the two approaches as well as some important 
differences. In terms of infinite-degree stochastic dominance, the two approaches are equivalent, because 
min{ } min{ } lim  and  lim .
ii
NN N
icv icx ss −∞ − →∞ →∞ = s UU UU
N
∞ = s  However, this equivalence does not hold for finite n and s. 
  At a very basic level, our multivariate stochastic dominance is a natural extension of standard 
univariate stochastic dominance in that both are based on a preference between combining good with bad 
  18and combining good with good and bad with bad. A preference for combining good with bad leads to 
multivariate concave dominance and the most common univariate dominance. The opposite preference 
leads to multivariate convex dominance and a risk-taking version of univariate dominance. The 
preference condition is easy for decision makers to understand and therefore easy to check. If the decision 
maker has a consistent preference one way or the other, this implies corresponding constraints on the 
utility function via   and  ,
N
∞ UU
N
∞  but the discussion about preferences does not require direct 
consideration of utility. 
  Dominance in the sense of the s-increasing orders cannot be related to a simple preference 
assumption, but it can be characterized in terms of integral conditions that are extensions of the integral 
conditions for standard univariate dominance. In contrast, our multivariate dominance admits no such 
integral conditions. From a practical standpoint, however, the integral conditions in (4) and (5) might be 
difficult to verify as N increases or 
1
N
i i s
= ∑  increases. 
  Of course, not all decision makers share the same preferences. Thus, the preferences of different 
decision makers can be consistent with different classes of utility functions and therefore with different 
definitions of dominance. The approach to multivariate stochastic dominance developed here is intuitively 
appealing and should fit the preferences of some decision makers. As such, it is a useful addition to the 
stochastic dominance toolbox.   
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The concept of stochastic dominance has been widely studied in the univariate case, and there is 
widespread agreement on an underlying stochastic order for such dominance. This standard order is 
consistent with a basic preference condition, a preference for combining good with bad, as opposed to 
combining good with good and bad with bad. Many multivariate stochastic orders have been studied. 
However, most lack sufficient connections with the standard univariate stochastic dominance order and 
are not based on an intuitive preference condition that is easy to explain to decision makers. We fill this 
gap by defining multivariate n
th-degree concave stochastic dominance and n
th-degree risk in a way that 
  19naturally extends the univariate case because it is consistent with the same basic preference assumption. 
As in the univariate case, multivariate infinite-degree stochastic dominance is equivalent to an 
exponential ordering. We also develop the notion of multivariate convex stochastic dominance, which is 
consistent with a preference for combining good with good and bad with bad, as opposed to combining 
good with bad. 
After developing our notion of multivariate stochastic dominance, we present some results that 
are useful in applying our multivariate stochastic dominance relations to rank alternatives. We show that 
independent additive or multiplicative background risk does not change stochastic dominance orderings, 
discuss the ordering of multivariate normal distributions, and show how stochastic dominance can be 
applied to the choice among several alternatives using elimination by mixtures. We further illustrate our 
results with simple examples, and we discuss the connection of our approach with one based on a family 
of multivariate orders having some similarities to the order we use.  
Many situations involve multiple decision makers, and somewhat divergent preferences can make 
decision making challenging. Even if each member of the group assesses a utility function (a challenging 
task itself, particularly in a multiattribute setting), it would be surprising for all members of the group to 
have identical utilities. However, the preferences of group members might be somewhat similar, 
especially when they are making a decision for their company and not a personal decision. They most 
likely will agree on a preference for more of each attribute to less or can define the attributes in such a 
way as to guarantee that preference, so that first-order stochastic dominance is applicable. They might 
also agree that the company’s situation makes it prudent to be risk averse and that in general, a preference 
for combining good with bad is reasonable. This implies that they all should be willing to use a utility 
function   for any  1
N
n u ∈ U n >  and therefore to use multiattribute concave stochastic dominance to 
eliminate some alternatives from consideration.  
Making a decision in a multiattribute situation is likely to be a multistage process. Some 
alternatives might be eliminated using stochastic dominance; choice among other alternatives might 
require more careful preference assessments, with emphasis on particular tradeoffs. That in turn might 
  20lead to clarification of objectives and attributes, and generation of new promising alternatives (Keeney 
1992). The results of our paper can be useful in that kind of decision process. 
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